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Our pattern of federal securities control has traditionally placed great faith and
reliance upon the principle of industry self-regulation. Long before the adoption
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 the stock exchanges had evolved a system
of internal government regulating the admission and conduct of members.2 The
Exchange Act built on this self-regulatory structure by placing initial responsibility
for policing brokers and dealers who were members of an organized exchange upon
that body.
Until x938, however, no similar organization existed with respect to securities
firms engaged in an over-the-counter business. In that year the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the securities industry joined hands in promoting
the formation of an institutional organization to administer a system of self-regulation
with respect to firms doing an interstate securities business in. the over-the-counter
markets? This cooperation led to the joint sponsorship by the Commission and the
Investment Bankers Conference (IBC) of legislation which culminated in the
* This article bears an authorship date of May 20, 1964.
tA.B. 1927, Park College; A.M. 1934, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1939, University of Cali-
fornia, Berkeley. Coffroth Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Member of the California
bar.
148 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1958).
The organization typically, although not invariably, took the form of a voluntary unincorporated associ-
ation. The constitution and bylaws prescribed rules for the admission, discipline and expulsion of members.
These rules were regarded as a contract to which each member agreed to adhere. For one of the earliest
reported American cases advancing the contract theory in connection with an organization of stock
brokers, see White v. Brownell, 2 Daly 329, 4 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 162 (C.P.N.Y. 1868). Incorporation was
eschewed for fear of judicial interference with the internal affairs of the association. Equity courts had
intervened to prevent expulsion of a member of a corporation in extreme cases on the theory that the
member had derived his rights by virtue of the statute creating the corporation, rather than by contract
with the other members. A voluntary association, on the other hand, is not a creature of statute; and the
privilege of membership was deemed to be conferred by the organization itself. Such voluntary bodies
were allowed to prescribe their own rules. Where the rules were adhered to the body could discipline or
expel a member; if the proceedings were regular and taken in good faith the courts refused to intervene.
And see Belton v. Hatch, 109 N.Y. 593, 17 N.E. 225 (1888) (New York Stock Exchange); CHARL.S H.
MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES 37-49 (931); CHA.aES A. DicE & WILFoan J.
EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET 90-95 (2d ed. 194).
" For the historical background of the Maloney Act and the National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD), see Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R.
Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., Ist Sss. pt. 4, at 6o4-07 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study); S. REP.
No. 1455 and H.R. REP. 2307, 7 5 th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938); address by SEC Chairman William 0.
Douglas before the Bond Club of Hartford, Conn., Jan. 7, 1938, in Conference News, published by In-
vestment Bankers Conference, Inc., vol. I, No. iiA, Jan. 8, 1938; address by Senator Francis T. Maloney
to California Security Dealers Association, Investment Bankers Association, and NASD, San Francisco,
Aug. 22, 1939.
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passage of the Maloney Act, adding section 15A to the Exchange Act.4 As a result of
this legislation, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) came into
existence as a self-regulatory institution for the over-the-counter markets. Although
membership in the NASD is purely voluntary, under the authority prescribed in
section i5A(i) (i) of the Exchange Act an NASD rule precludes an NASD member
from dealing with a non-member broker or dealer except at the prices and on the
same terms and conditions accorded to members of the public Thus, for all
practical purposes, the vast majority of brokers or dealers in securities must be mem-
bers of the NASD in order to engage profitably in most underwritings and over-the-
counter business. At the same time, however, certain retail sales organizations
which deal directly with the public .rather than with other securities firms may
engage in the securities business without the economic necessity of joining the
NASD. These firms, which include certain large, integrated mutual fund retail
sales" organizations and retailers of securities issued by real estate syndicates, have
refused to submit themselves to industry self-regulation by joining the NASD. With
these exceptions, most of the securities fiims of the country are members of one of the
sef-regulatory instittitions through membership in a stock exchange or in the NASD.
Although important regulatory responsibilities are placed upon these sel-govern-
ing institutions unde'r 'the Exchange Act, the Commission is assigned the task of
supervising the operation of ibis system of self-government. Furthermore, Congress
gave it the reserve power to step in and regulate directly when dissatisfied with in-
dustry rules or practices.7 During the past thirty years, however, the Commission
has been a rather tame watchdog; only once has it chosen to alter existing rules of
the exchanges (as distinguished from its own rules) rather than wait for action by
thein dustry.8 Thus, over the years, self-regulation has come to mean, at least to the
452 Star. 1070 (1938), i5 U.S.C. I 780-3 (1958). ,
52 Stat. 1073 (1938), 15 U.S.C. .78o-3(i) (1958); NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 25,
NASD MANUAL D-13.
'As of Dec. 31, 1962, the NASD membership constituted 4,771 firms or 83% of the 5,724 firms
registered with the Cominission under § x5 of the Exchange Act. A high percentage of the securities
salesmen of the country, comprising some 94,444 individuals, was registered with the NASD as registered
representatives. Special Sludy, Pt. 4, at 603.
'Section 1g(b) of the Exchange Act vests in the Commission power to alter or supplement exchange
rules in respect of twelve specified areas of exchange operations. 48 Stat. 898 (1934), x5 U.S.C. § 78s(b)
(I95. The Commsission has similar power with respect to certain NASD rules. See § xsA(k)(a), 52
Star. i074 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(k)(2) (1958). In addition, the Commission may abrogate any
NASD rules when it finds that such abrogation is necessary or appropriate to assure fair dealing by the
members of the NASD. See § 1sA(k)(ij, 52 Stat. 1074 (z938), 15 U.S.C. § 7 80-3(k)(1) (1958). For
a discussion of the Commission's powers in these areas, see p. 676, infra. Section xx authorizes the
Co'mission to prescribe its own rules (i) "to regulate or prevent" floor trading; and (2) to prevent
excessive off-floor trading by. exchange members. 48, Stat. .891 (934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78k
(1958). The Commission has never adopted a rule under section xx but has followed the practice of
"suggesting" that the exchanges themselves adopt .any necessary rules. The Commission, however, has
recenty, given notice of a significanit departure from this pattern; new proposed rule ixa-x,, severely
restricting floor trading, is to be issued as.a Cqmmjision,,ule.. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 7290, April 9, 1964 and note .9 infra. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is to file a plan
concerning' floor trading which conforms to .proposals. previously made by .the Commission. Failure to
adhere to the plan will violate the Exchange Act rule.8 The single occasion in which the Commission exercised its powers under §5 g(b) occurred
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industry and particularly to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), that the SEC
will observe a rather passive role, leaving the industry to govern itself in its own
wisdom.
The bull market which began in 1956 and collapsed in May 1962, put this form
of securities control to a severe test. In far too many instances there was a failure
to track down wrongdoers until long after the damage had been done. In the case
of the American Stock Exchange an after-the-fact investigation revealed a complete
breakdown of industry self-regulation and the ineffectiveness of government over-
sight by the SEC Even before this investigation was completed, however, Congress
if'1i96i had directed the Commission "to make a study aftd investigation of the
adequacy, for the protection of investors, of the rules of the national securities ex-
changes and national securities associations, including rules for the expulsion,
suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade." The Commission was asked to make a report con-
taining such recommendations for legislation as it deemed advisable.1 ,
This investigation culminated in the Report of the Special Study of the Securities
Markets, the most comprehensive study of its kind yet made. Chapter 12 'of the
report concentrates on the system of self-government in- the securities industry,
evaluates the effectiveness of the various self-regulatory institutions-the New York
Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, the principal regional 'exchanges,
the NASD and certain quasi-regulatory agencies-and assesses the role of the SEC
as "supervisor" of these agencies. 1 The report notes the absence of self-regulatory
institutions in certain areas, primarily retailers of interests in mutual funds and real
estate syndicates. It proposes that these gaps in the self-regulatory machinery be
closed.' 2 The voluntary membership system of the NASD would be supplanted by
a compulsory system under which all brokers and dealers using the mails to facilitate
securities transactions, whether or not engaged in an interstate business, must join
a self-regulatory organization, subject to the power of the Commission to grant
exemptions where necessary or appropriate. These proposals have been embodied in
the Commission's 1963 legislative program now before the Congress. 3
when the NYSE refused to change its rules preventing a NYSE member from acting as an odd-lot
dealer or specialist upon a regional exchange in securities listed on the NYSE and traded on both
exchanges. In the Matter of the New York Stock Exchange, 1o S.E.C. 270 (1941). See Special Study,
Pt. 4, at 704.
o SEC STAFF REPORT, ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND REGULATION OF CONDUCT OF MEMBERS OF
THE AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (1962), reprinted in Special Study, pt. 4, at 751-814. Since this so-
called Amex report was issued, that exchange has undergone a thorough reorganization. See Hearings on
H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 88th Cong., ist & 2d Sess., pt. I, at 417-6oo (5963-64)..
10 75 Stat. 465 (596r), as amended, i5 U.S.C. § 78s (Supp. IV,' x962).
'x Special Study, pt. 4, at 495-750 .
ld. at 692. ' ....
18 See S. x642, H.R. 6789, 88th Cong., zst Sess. (1963). S. 1642, with amendments, received a favor-
able report from the Committee on Banking and Currency. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.(x963). The bill passed the Senate on July 30, x963. H.R. 6793, representing H.R. 6789 with the
Senate amendments, was referred to the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House Committee
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Certain other recommendations of the Special Study relate to stock exchange
reform. These include the recommendation that floor trading be banned in phases
starting in 1964 and concluding in i965;' 4 that the specialist system be overhauled
and subjected to more stringent regulation;15 and that certain changes be made in the
odd-lot system 1 The Special Study strongly suggests that although the Commission
should continue to give maximum scope to self-regulation wherever a regulation
is needed, the Commission should close the gap between the total regulatory need
and the quantity and quality of self-regulation, by exercising close supervision
through changes in existing rules of the self-regulatory agencies and by direct
regulation where self-regulation is inadequate."'
This penetrating analysis of the operation of cooperative regulation, perhaps
coupled with congressional encouragement or pressure,13 has apparently impelled the
Commission to assert its reserve powers in order to correct certain abuses that have
persisted, particularly in stock exchange practices. These moves on the part of the
Commission have been met so far by the stiff resistance of the officials of the NYSE
and the American Stock Exchange (Amex). The "Big Board" and the SEC have
just gone through an eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation over the Commission's
proposal to ban or greatly restrict floor trading. 9 This showdown struggle over
floor trading was heralded as the "biggest fight between the Big Board and the
. . . Commission since New Deal days."2  The "bloodless triumph" gained by
the Commission may foreshadow further changes in stock exchange rules and
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. See Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642, supra note 9, pt .
1-2. Both the Subcommittee and the full Committee made extensive changes in H.R. 6793. The bill,
as amended, was reported out on May ig, 1964. H.R. REP. No. 5418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (z964),
"SpeCdal Study, pt. 2, at 238-42.
15 Id. at 161-71.
"'Id. at 199-202.
'Special Study, pt. 4, at 722-28.
' See Kohlmeier, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 2, 1963, p. 12, col. 4. "It's understood that the Congress.
men privately insisted to the SEC that the section [of the Special Study on "Self-Regulation and the
Commission"] be included." Ibid.
"9 After a series of closed door meetings between NYSE officials and the SEC, it was reported that
the Commission was likely to move soon to ban or sharply restrict floor trading by stock exchange
members. Wall Street Journal, March il, 1964, p. 2, col. 3. On March 16, 1964, Mr. G. Keith Funston,
President of the NYSE, advised the Exchange membership by letter that the Commission had broken
off discussions with Exchange officials on an SEC proposal to "ban floor trading on the exchange or to
restrict it so severely as to eliminate its benefits." NYSE News Release, March i6, 1964, p. i. And see
N.Y. Times, March 16, 1964, p. 47, col. 6; Wall Street Journal, March 16, x964, p. 2, col. 2. The
Amex joined the Big Board in defending the floor traders on the ground that they "added substantial
liquidity to markets that need liquidity and on balance . . . have provided a stabilizing force." Wall
Street Journal, March 17, x964, p. S, col. 3. A few days later the NYSE announced that the Board of
Governors had approved in principle a series of changes in exchange rules governing floor trading. NYSE
News Release, March 23, x964; Wall Street Journal, March 2o, 1964, P. 24, col. x; id., March 23, x964,
P. 3 col. i. This move did not satisfy the SEC which countered with a proposal to issue its own
rules restricting floor trading and hold public hearings thereon. N.Y. Times, March 24, 1964, p. 45,
cols. i and 8; id., April 6, 1964, p. 45, col. 3. On April 8, 1964 the Commission announced new
proposed rule tia-i making a fundamental change in SEC control of floor trading; and the NYSE an-
nounced that they would go along with the new rules. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 729
o
, April
9, x964; N.Y. Tines, April 9, 1964, p. x, col. x; id., p. 41 , col. 6; id., p. 48, cols. 2 and 5.
1 Wall Street Journal, March 25, 1964, p. 26, col. 2.
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practices in problem areas and may indicate an attempt to shift the balance of
power within the stock exchange membership itself so as to lessen the disproportionate
influence of the floor professionals in the government of the Exchange as compared
with the brokerage firms that deal directly with the public?1
This new-found firmness on the part of the Commission, which has been con-
strued in some quarters as an "attack on Wall Street," ' makes a reappraisal of the
relative roles of the industry and the Commission in the self-regulatory system par-
ticularly timely. In this paper an attempt will be made to review the historical basis
of the self-regulatory principle and the intent of congressional legislation. Attention
will also be given to the problems posed by this dual system of regulation, including
costs and duplication of effort, as well as the practical values arising from industry
involvement and participation. Finally, consideration will be given to what
improvements may be made in the system in order to render investor protection
more effective without unduly hampering legitimate business.
I
EVOLUTION OF THE SELF-REGuLATORY SYsTEm
A. The Exchanges
Prior to the enactment of the Exchange Act, in 1934, the stock exchanges of the
country were subject to little or no external regulation. As voluntary associations
they were treated by the law as private clubs. The constitution and bylaws were
held to express a "contract by which each member had consented to be bound, and
which measures his duties, rights and privileges." 3
The exchanges also maintained a strict control over dealings between members
and nonmembers in several ways. The quotations of transactions on an exchange
are essential to firms engaged in the securities business. The exchanges early con-
tracted with communications companies to furnish quotations, subject to the condi-
tion that the ticker service be made available only to such persons as the exchange
approved. The courts held that although such quotations could not be copyrighted,24
they were the property of the exchange entitled to protection as a trade secret.25
State courts differed as to whether an exchange or communication medium might
discriminate as between applicants for quotation service.2  However, in 1926 the
United States Supreme Court held that the exchange was not bound to make its
"
1 N.Y. Times, April 9, x964, P. 41, col. 6; see Special Study, pt. 4, at 571. This study focuses
mainly on the NYSE, although the same points apply in varying degree to the Amex and the regional
exchanges.
"'See editorial, "The Attack on Wall Street," Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1964, p. 12, col. 4.
" Belton v. Hatch, supra note 2, at 596, 17 N.E. at 226.
'National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., i g Fed. 294 (7th Cir. 19o2).
" Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
The Illinois Supreme Court held that market quotations were clothed with a public interest and
ruled that they must be furnished to all on equal terms. New York & Chicago Grain & Stock Exch. v.
Board of Trade, 127 III. 153, 19 N.E. 855 (1889). The New York courts took a contrary view. Matter
of Renville, 46 App. Div. 37, 6z N.Y. Supp. 549 (899). See MEYER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 49-6o.
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quotations generally available to all persons willing to pay for the service: "In
furnishing the quotations to one and refusing to furnish them to another, the
exchange is but exercising the ordinary right of a private vendor of news or other
property."2 7  Until recently, the NYSE also forbade its members to establish private
direct wire or other connections with nonmembers without prior consent of the
Exchange. Discontinuance of any such connections could be compelled at any
timeYs Last.year, however, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,2 9 the Supreme
Court held that the collective action of the Exchange in ordering a member to
discontinue private wire connections with a nonmember, without affording the
nonmember a hearing and an opportunity to refute any charge of misconduct,
yiolates the antitrust laws. As a result of the Silver decision, the NYSE no longer
refuses ticker service to nonmembers. Anyone who wants this service may have it
by paying for it at standard rates3
The status of the Big Board as a private club created some concern that personal
rather than public interests dominated exchange government. As early as 19o9 the
Hughes Commission l had been urged to recommend that the NYSE be incorpo-
rated in order "to bring it more completely under the authority and supervision
of the State and the process of the courts. '3' The Hughes Commission rejected this
view "in the expectation that the Exchange... will be active in preventing wrong-
doing such as has occurred in the past. '33
At the federal level, the Pujo Committee 4 investigated the need for government
regulation of the stock exchanges prior to the outbreak of World War I. The Pujo
Committee discovered that the authorities of the NYSE were aware of various
manipulative practices, including pool operations, and that no effective measures to
prevent such practices were takenf5 Nevertheless, the Exchange insisted that it still
should be permitted to continue to operate as a voluntary organization "with the
"'Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., supra note 25, at 6o5.
"NYSE Rule 355, suspended Sept. 20, 196x. 2 CCH NYSE GUIDE t 2355.
29 373 U.S. 341, 365 (1963).
'0 See testimony of Mr. G. Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange, in Hearings on
HR. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. z642, supra note 9, pt. i, at 37X. The Exchange still restricts the use which
may be made of quotations in order to protect its interest in them. See NYSE Rule 359, 2 CCH NYSE
GUIDE V 2359.
" This commission was appointed by Charles Evans Hughes, then Governor of New York, to report
on stock exchange speculation following the panic of 1907. The report of the commission appears in
WVnLiAm C. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM WITHIN 415-46 (1913). And see Meyer, The
New York Stock Exchange and the Panic of z907, 18 YALE Rv. 34 (1909).
"VAN ANTwER', op. cit. supra note 31, at 427. The commission noted that as a voluntary
organization the exchange had "almost unlimited power over the conduct of its members"; this feature
was thought to possess the advantage of speed in handling disciplinary problems while preserving substantial
justice for the membership. The commission was of the view that the spirit of comradeship among
members had led them to overlook misconduct on the part of fellow-members, and that there had been
a failure to take proper measures to prevent wrongdoing. Ibid.
3" Ibid.
81 Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the'House Committee on Banking and Currency on Investiga-
tion of Financial and Monetary Conditions in the United States Under House Resolutions Nos. 429 and
5o4 (Money Tr.ust Investigation), 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1913).
85 d. at 42.54.
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privileges and freedom of action of a private dub and should not be made subject to
legislative or judicial control or supervision. '3 The Committee disagreed and
recommended that the Exchange be required to incorporate and that it be subjected
to federal regulation3 ' Nothing came of these proposals.
Matters stood in this posture in 1934 when the Exchange Act was before the
Congress. The stock market crash and subsequent exposures by congressional
investigation had made federal stock market control inevitable s The battle was
pitched in terms of the degree of federal intervention in exchange government and
the extent to which the exchanges would be allowed to function under a system
of self-regulation. At the direction of President Roosevelt, Secretary of Commerce
Roper had appointed an interdepartmental committee on stock exchange regula-
tionO' The committee reported in January 1934, recommending the establishment
of a federal stock exchange authority to license stock exchanges. Use of the mails
and interstate facilities would be forbidden to exchanges not licensed by the authority.
The Committee stressed the desirability of leaving a large measure of initiative and
responsibility to the exchanges with the stock exchange authority possessing the
"authority to move quickly and to the point when the necessity arises."4
The original bill,41 which ultimately became the Exchange Act, went further
in the direction of direct regulation of the exchanges. It would have forbidden a
stock exchange firm that acted as a broker to act as a dealer or underwriter in
securities.42  It would also have banned floor trading. Specialists were to be pro-
hibited from executing market orders and from trading for their own account as
dealers 3
Opposition to these sweeping proposals arose from within the Roosevelt admin-
istration. John Dickinson, Chairman of the Roper Committee, became the leading
spokesman in favor of building on the system of self-regulation. It was his theory
that "if governmental regulation attempts to do too much directly and to control
and intervene directly in the first instance over the whole field which it covers, it
is in danger of breaking down under its own weight and proving ineffective.""
" id. at 115.
37 Ibid.
" See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency on Stock Exchange Practices,
73d Cong., Ist Sess. (x933); S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); FERDINAND PECORA, WALL
STREET UNDER OATH (1939).
SThe Roper Committee consisted of Messrs. John Dickinson, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, as
Chairman, and A. A. Berle, Arthur H. Dean, and Henry J. Richardson, a Washington lawyer. For
the report, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 73D CONG., 2D SESS.,
STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION, LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO CHAIRMAN OF CoMMITTEE ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY WITH AN ACCOMPANYING REPORT RELATIVE TO STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATIONS (Comm. Print
1934); also printed in N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1934, P. 24, col. 2.
40 Ibid.
, H.R. 7852. See Hearing on HR, 7852 and 8720, Stock Exchange Regulation, Before the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15, (1934).
" Id. at 7, § io. This provision followed the recommendation of a study conducted by the Twentieth
Century Fund in 1933-34. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SECURITY MARKETS 674 (1935).
4a Hearing on H.R. 7852 and LR. 8720, Stock Exchange Regulation, supra note 41 at 7, 124, 5o8.
"Id. at 513.
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The functions of the governmental agency charged with regulating the stock
exchanges were to be "held in reserve" and "employed only to supplement and
supervise what in the first instance was self-regulation of the exchanges."4 Dickin-
son admitted that there was some truth in the charge "that the idea of self-regulation
is just a device to avoid regulation." Even so, he believed that it was a "necessary
recourse in view of the mere physical limitations in time and in personnel, which
operate on the direct exercise of the powers of government as the task of regulation
becomes more and more extensive over a wider and wider field."4
As a result of these criticisms and strong opposition from the securities industry
and the business community, a compromise was struck.41 Under the Exchange Act,
as it finally emerged, exchanges are required to register with the SEC in order for
such exchanges or their members to use the mails or interstate facilities to effect
transactions in securities or to transmit quotations48 As a condition to registration,
each registered exchange must agree "to comply, and to enforce so far as is within
its powers compliance by its members," with the Exchange Act and any rules issued
thereunder49 Furthermore, the rules of the exchange must include provisions "for
the expulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct ... inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade," and must declare that the willful viola-
tion of the Exchange Act or any rules thereunder "shall be considered conduct...
inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade.""°  The act does not in
specific terms compel a registered exchange to submit rule changes to the Commission
for approval prior to adoption; however, the exchange must make available to the
Commission any amendments in exchange rules upon their adoption.51
45 Ibid.
" 1d. at 514. Mr. Dickinson recognized that the exchanges would frequently fail to do a good job
in regulating their members. Government regulation, however, should be applied to make the exchanges
enforce discipline "and to come down on them like a ton of bricks if they did not do their job, rather
than for the Government itself to take over from them that job of direct regulation and attempt to
perform it from the very beginning and in the first instance by governmental policing methods." Ibid.
"'After three weeks of hearings on the original bill, H.R. 8720 was drafted to meet what were
regarded as legitimate criticisms. See Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 872o, Stock Exchange Regulation,
supra note 41, at 625.
Securities Exchange Act § 5, 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. f 78e (958).
'
9 Securities Exchange Act § 6(a)(x), 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(1) (1958).
5oSecurities Exchange Act § 6(b), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (i958).
"
5 Securities Exchange Act § 6(a)(4), 48 Stat. 886 (934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(4) (1958). Since 1956,
by informal agreement, the NYSE has given the Commission two weeks' notice of rule changes prior to
their effectiveness. Special Study, Pt. 4, at 711. Nevertheless, the provision in 5 6(a)(4) that copies shall
be furnished "forthwith upon their adoption" created a nagging doubt that the Commission was not en-
titled to advance notice. In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., supra note 29, at 357, however, the Court
with full awareness of § 6(a) (4) stated that the power conferred on the Commission by 5 i9(b), supra note
8, to request exchanges to make changes in their rules impliedly gives the Commission the power to
disapprove any rule adopted by an exchange. The Commission thereafter gave notice of proposed new
rule i7a-8 which would require a registered exchange to file with the Commission any proposed change
in its rules at least three weeks before effectiveness. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7218, Jan. so,
1964. The SEC General Counsel finds the statutory authority under 5 x7(a) of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat.
897 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 78q(a) (1958) giving the Commission broad authority to require
reports from exchanges and § 23(a) of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 9o (1934), as amended, IS US.C. 5 78w
(1958). See SEC General Counsel's Memorandum, Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. z642, npra
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Section 19 vests the Commission with certain powers over registered exchanges
to obtain compliance with the Exchange Act and rules thereunder. The Commission
may suspend an exchange for a period not exceeding twelve months for violations
of the Exchange Act and rules thereunder or for failure to enforce, so far as is within
its powers, compliance therewith by stock exchange members or issuers of listed
securities. The Commission may also suspend for a period of not more than twelve
months, or expel a member or officer of an exchange, if such person is found to have
violated the Exchange Act or rules. The power to close the exchange is a far too
drastic sanction, except under the most unusual circumstances; however, these
sanctions provide the Commission with the mechanisms to compel compliance
with its own rules.
The Commission has the power in certain areas set forth in the margin to initiate
specific changes in the rules and practices of a registered exchange if after a request,
notice and opportunity for hearing the exchange fails to act.52 Such action may be
taken if the Commission finds that such changes are "necessary or appropriate for
the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities" traded over the
exchange or "to insure fair administration" of the exchange.
Finally, under section ii the Commission may make rules in the public interest
or for the protection of investors (I) "to regulate or prevent" floor trading by mem-
bers of registered exchanges for their own account or for discretionary accounts, and
(2) to prevent such excessive off-floor trading by exchange members as it determines
to be detrimental to the maintenance of a fair and orderly market!' Similarly, the
Commission may regulate specialists and odd-lot dealers who must be registered as
such. Moreover, specialists apparently may be prohibited from dealing for their
own account; for if under SEC rules a specialist "is permitted to act as a dealer,"
such rules shall restrict his dealings "to those reasonably necessary to permit him
to maintain a fair and orderly market." ''5
This statutory pattern presents certain anomalies. Although the Commission
may discipline a member of an exchange for violation of the Exchange Act or rules,
note 9, Pt. 2, at 1070. The NYSE rejects this view. On the basis, however, that the proposed rule is only
a reporting requirement rather than an attempt to assert the authority to delay an exchange from the
exercise of its rule-making powers, the Exchange has decided not to oppose adoption of the rule or contest
its validity. See letters of G. Keith Funston, President of the New York Stock Exchange, to Chairman
Harley 0. Staggers of the House Subcommittee and to SEC Commissioner William L. Cary, id. at 1137-38.
-' Securities Exchange Act § 19(b), supra note 7. These embrace "such matters as" (z) financial
responsibility of members; (2) restriction of registration or trading in new issues for a specified period
after issuance; (3) listing or delisting of securities; (4) hours of trading; (5) manner, method and place of
soliciting business; (6) fictitious or numbered accounts; (7) matters concerning settlements, payments, and
deliveries and of closing accounts; (8) reporting of transactions both on and outside of the exchange; (9)
fixing of reasonable commission rates and other charges; (so) minimum units of trading; (ii) odd-lot
transactions; (12) minimum deposits on margin accounts; and (13) similar matters. The wording implies
that the enumeration does not exhaust the Commission's powers.
30 § zi(a), supra note 7. Exemptions may be extended to transactions by odd-lot dealers and specialists.
"a Securities Exchange Act § zs(b), supra note 7.
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it may not compel him to comply with the rules of the exchange." Furthermore, the
Exchange Act does not prescribe procedures of registered exchanges applicable in
discipline cases, nor does it provide for Commission review, on its own motion or
upon application of an aggrieved person, of an exchange's enforcement activities.
5
Shortly after the adoption of the Exchange Act and during the chairmanship of
Mr. Joseph P. Kennedy, the Commission made a comprehensive survey of the
activities of specialists, floor traders, and odd-lot dealers on the NYSE and other
exchanges. The Commission then formulated "suggested" rules for the regulation
of trading on the exchanges. These rules were sent to registered exchanges with
the Commission's request that they be adopted as rules of the exchange. Most
registered exchanges adopted the rules as recommended or with slight modifica-
tions! 6 These rules were designed to make it more difficult to sell short on a falling
market by forbidding short sales below the last reported sale. The specialist
system was continued, thus permitting a member registered as specialist in one or
more stocks to act as a broker for other members in the execution of customer orders,
as well as to deal in such stocks for his own account. A specialist combining the
functions of broker and dealer, however, could trade for his own account, only
where reasonably necessary in order to enable him "to maintain a fair and orderly
mnarket."
These efforts at self-regulation failed to accomplish their objective in full
measure.!7 It is true that an interpretation of the rules frequently entailed the
application of subjective standards. Of more significance, however, was the fact
that the governing board of the Exchange was dominated by the specialists and floor
tiaderg, the very' roups most affected by the trading rules, whereas commission
brokers who deal directly with the public had little effective representation. Added
to this was the "private club" relationship between members, as a result of which
members showed an extreme reluctance to punish fellow members caught breaking
the rules 9 Furthermore, the Exchange has always surrounded disciplinary pro-
Although the Commission in theory might suspend the exchange for failure to enforce its dis.
ciplinary rules, we have already seen that this would be throwing the baby out with the bath.
" See Special Study, Pt. 4, at 704. In the case of the NYSE, if a member or allied member is
found guilty of fraudulent acts by a decision of a majority of the board of governors, he must be
expelled from the Exchange. For other violations of the Exchange's rules, the board may impose
penalties of censure, fine (not exceeding $5,ooo), suspension or expulsion. Id. at 538.
i SEC ANN. REP'. 13-14 (1935). The rules may be found in id. 40-44. And see WLLIAMT 0.
DouorLAs, DasocAcy AND FINANcE 66 (Allen ed. 1940).
"
7 In 1938, the Commission abandoned the self-regulatory approach to the control of short sales and
promulgated its own rules pursuant to authority granted in section io(a) of the Exchange Act. 48 Stat.
891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (958). See note zo8 infra.
" The Commission recognized the need for change in the rules of the exchanges in order to give
greater representation in exchange government to commission firms, as a means of insuring better
enforcement of disciplinary rules. See its report to Congress, in January 1935. H.R. Doc, No. 85,
74th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1935). The proposal was directed primarily at the NYSE; it envisage
"voluntary" action by the exchanges rather than direct regulation. See Special Study, pt. 4, at 5o6.
SSee DouoLAs, op. cit. supra note,56, at 65. The Special Study observes that this tendency persists:
"In the disciplinary area-the handling of revealed violations--the Exchange leans toward tenderness
rather than severity ... " Special Study, pt. 4, at 574.
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ceedings with a wall of secrecy. Even today, actions taken against members and
allied members are not publicly reported, except in cases of suspension or expulsion.60
In 1937, when Mr. William 0. Douglas assumed the chairmanship of the Commis-
sion, he opened negotiations with the NYSE looking toward a reorganization of its
internal governm~ent.6" Commission studies had led Mr. Douglas to conclude that
the operations of the floor trader, the specialist and the odd-lot dealer had resulted
in a number of abuses. For example, Commission statistics showed that there was
a strong tendency for the floor professionals (both specialists and floor traders) to
accentuate market swings by selling short for speculative profit at a time when the
market was declining and buying heavily on margin in an upward swing, thus
exerting a destabilizing influence which contributed to the severity of price fluctua-
tions. Furthermore, at crucial times, the odd-lot dealers failed to pass on to the
round-lot market a substantial part of the market support supplied by customers'
purchases.62 These professional traders as a group dominated the Exchange govern-
ment and blocked any reform that might limit their profit opportunities.
When the Exchange refused to budge, Chairman Douglas issued a public state-
ment warning the Exchange to put its house in order by means of self-regulation
or face more pervasive direct regulation by the Commission under the powers
granted in the Exchange Act.63 Shortly thereafter, the President of the Exchange
announced the appointment of the Conway Committee to study the organization
and administration of the Exchange and make recommendations.
6 4
The report of the Conway Committee, in January 1937, recommended sweeping
changes in Exchange government and operating methods. The Board of Governors
was to be reorganized to include office partners of member firms, both those based
in New York City and out-of-town, and three new members appointed to represent
the public. The administration of the affairs of the Exchange by the use of volun-
teers was to be supplanted by the development of a professional staff. A non-
member full-time paid president was to be elected with authority to appoint all
officers except the chairman and vice chairman of the board of governors. A
permanent executive staff was to be developed under the direct supervision of the
president to administer Exchange affairs on a business-like basis thus relieving board
members of administrative details and enabling them to concentrate on policy. These
recommendations were approved by the Exchange membership and by May 1938
had become effective.6P5
Further important changes in the constitution and policies of the Exchange
I01d. at 540-42, 574.
¢ See DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 64-73; Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 92o, 944-47 (1964).
e" DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 56, at 67-71.
"' N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1937, P. 1, cOl. 5; id., p. 31, col. 2. DOUGLAS, op. cit. supra note 56, at
63-73.
0' See 4 SEC ANN. REP. 20-22 (1938).
or Special Study, Pt. 4, at 5o6-og.
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occurred in i949-5o. These changes were initiated by a group of floor members
known as the Committee of 17. The object was to improve the position of the floor
members in the Exchange power structure vis 'a vis other member blocs. The board
of governors was increased to thirty-three members, its present size; certain floor
trading rules which it was claimed inhibited a free auction market were repealed;
and the constitution was amended to provide that a 2-year interval must elapse
before re-election to the board of governors after two terms of service."6
Unquestionably the administration of the affairs of the New York Stock Ex-
change over the years has been of a very high order. Nevertheless, the recent conflict
between the Exchange and the SEC over floor trading again brings into sharp focus
the unsolved problems remaining with respect to specialists, odd-lot dealers, and
commission rates, including the problem of quantity discounts for volume pur-
chases. The Special Study investigation of the Exchange as a self-regulatory institu-
tion rates its performance quite high, but points out that there is still an unsatis-
factory discharge of function in some areas. In assessing the reasons for failure of
the system in certain respects the Special Study cites the disproportionate number
of floor professionals in the government of the Exchange, stemming ultimately
from the allocation of voting power under the Exchange constitution."7 These floor
professionals are naturally primarily interested in their own activities on the trading
floor as contrasted with those governors associated with member firms engaged
primarily in a public brokerage business.68
"Id. at 508. The board of governors consists of the chairman, president, three public members
and twenty-eight members in three specific categories: (1) 13 regular members, who must be based in
New York; (2) 5 allied members and one regular member, all of whom must be New York based and
be affiliated with brokers conducting business with the public; and (3) 9 regular or allied members, each
of whom must be affiliated with an out-of-town firm which conducts a brokerage business with the
public. Thus 14 governors must be regular members holding a seat on the Exchange and 23 may be of
this category. id. at 509.
" Id. at 571. The right to vote in elections and on constitutional changes is limited to holders of a
scat ("regular members") of the Exchange. There are 1,366 seats, all of which must be "owned" by
an individual. Some 668 of these are owned by floor professionals, 648 by member firm partners and
50 seats are inactive. Id. at 518.
"The recent announcement of the nominees for election to the Exchange's Board of Governors has
raised speculation whether the choices reflect an effort to meet SEC criticism. The present board,
excluding the president and public members, consists of 7 specialists, 4 floor partners, one independent
broker, and 17 non-floor members. The new mix would consist of 6 specialists, 5 floor partners, one
independent broker, and 17 members or allied members who are affiliated with firms doing a public
brokerage business. It is believed that no great significance is to be attached to this slight change in
composition.
The Special Study recommended that the disproportionate influence by the floor professionals arising
from limiting voting rights to regular members holding "seats" on the Exchange could be reduced by
giving full or partial voting rights to allied members, that is, partners and voting stockholders of mem-
ber organizations. Special Study, Pt. 4, at 576. It is understood that the Exchange has arranged
to invite allied members to the quarterly membership meetings, which heretofore have been limited
to full-fledged members. Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1964, p. 6, col. 2. There have even been
rumors of a "revolt" by the big brokerage firms who are demanding greater representation on the
board of governors for off-floor members. Time, April 17, 1964, p. 104, col. 3.
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B. The National Association of Securities Dealers
The statutory pattern providing for self-regulation of the NASD differs markedly
from that of the exchanges. 9 Whereas the stock exchanges have resisted govern-
mental oversight, the NASD is an outgrowth of a desire by responsible representa-
tives of the over-the-counter business for some form of industry self-regulation
with oversight by the Commission. Furthermore, the industry concluded that the
objectives of the organization could not be attained without implementing legisla-
tion, particularly legislation providing an exemption from the antitrust lawsZ ° As
a result, the pattern of regulation represents improvements and refinements over the
1934 formula applicable to the stock exchanges.
Section 15 -A of the Exchange Act contemplates the registration of associations of
brokers or dealers as a national securities association if certain conditions are met.
The NASD is the only association so far registered under this section. A registered
association must open its membership to any broker or dealer who uses the mails or
interstate facilities to effect transactions in securities otherwise than on a national
securities exchange, with certain exceptions. In general, the rules of the association
must deny membership to any broker or dealer if he (or any partner, officer, director
or branch manager, or person in a control relationship) has previously been, or is
thereafter, suspended or expelled from a national securities exchange for violation of
any rule of the exchange which constitutes "conduct inconsistent with just and equi-
table principles of trade." Membership is similarly to be denied if the broker-dealer or
any such affiliated person (a) is the subject of an SEC order denying or revoking his
broker-dealer registration under section 15 of the Exchange Act, or suspending or
expelling him from membership in a registered securities association (NASD) or a
national securities exchange, or (b) has engaged in conduct as employee, agent, or
person in a control relationship, which was the cause of any such currently effective
order of an exchange, registered association, or the Commission7 1
The association rules must also be "designed to prevent fraudulent and manipula-
tive acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles of trade. . . and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest, and to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market. . ". . " They must also assure
fair representation to the membership in the administration of its affairs and provide
for the equitable allocation of dues among members7 Finally, provision must be
" For background material on the Maloney Act and the venture in cooperative regulation of the
over-the-counter markets, see Jennings, supra note 6i at 947-51; note 3 supra.
'o See Special Study, pt. 4, at 604-07.
" Securities Exchange Act § i5A(b)( 4 ), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), x5 U.S.C. § 780-3(b)(4) (z958). The
rules may also restrict membership on a geographical basis or upon the type of business done by its mem-
bers, or on such other basis as the Commission approves as being in the public interest or for the protection
of investors or to effectuate the self-regulatory purposes. § 15A(b)(3), 52 Stat. 1070 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§ 780-3(b)(3) (1958).
7 Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b) (7), 52 Stat. 1071 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(b) (7) (958).
7' Securities Exchange Act § i5A(b) (5)-(6), 52 Stat. 1071 (x938), 15 U.S.C. § 780(b) (5)-(6)
(1958).
676 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
made for disciplining of members for violation of the rules and for the establish-
ment of fair and orderly procedures relating to matters of discipline and denial of
membership.74
We have seen that the stock exchanges are completely free from external
controls by the SEC or the courts in disciplinary matters, subject to possible
restrictions arising under the antitrust laws. In contrast, section 15A gives the
Commission the authority, on its own motion, or upon application of any aggrieved
person, to review disciplinary actions against any member of the NASD or denials
of admission to that organization. 75  After notice and hearing the Commission may
sustain the action taken by the NASD or it may reduce or eliminate the penalty if it
is found to be excessive or oppressive, but such penalty may not be increased. 8
This departure from the pattern applicable to the stock exchanges seems an im-
portant and necessary ingredient of any system of industry self-regulation.
A further departure from the pattern applicable to the stock exchanges is to be
found in the duty of the NASD to file subsequent rule changes or additions with
the Commission prior to their effectiveness. If the Commission determines that
such change or addition is not consistent with the requirements for original registra-
tion of the association, it may enter an order of disapproval; otherwise the new rule
becomes effective thirty days after filing or such earlier date as the Commission
permits. 77
On the other hand, the Commission has far less authority to alter or supplement
NASD rules than it has with respect to exchanges under section i9 (b). Under section
i5A(k) the Commission has very limited powers to alter substantive rules of
registered associations. Its powers are largely restricted to abrogating, altering or
supplementing existing rules where necessary to ensure (i) fair representation of
members in the administration of the association's affairs, and (z) fair procedures for
admission and discipline of members, and in elections. The Commission also may
abrogate any rule if necessary "to assure fair dealing by the members of such associa-
tion... or otherwise to protect investors or effectuate the purposes of the Exchange
Act.78 However, under section 15, providing for the registration of brokers and
dealers, the Commission has rule-making powers with respect to the over-the-counter
markets somewhat comparable to those under section i9 (b) with respect to ex-
changes.79 Thus, the Commission may exercise its rule-making power to outlaw
acts or practices which it deems to be fraudulent, deceptive, manipulative, or in-
'"Securities Exchange Act § z5 A(b)(9), 52 Stat. xo7, (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 78o-3(b)(9) (1958).
The institution of review proceedings operates as a stay of such action until the Commission disposes
of the matter. Securities Exchange Act § 1sA(g), 52 Stat. 1073 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780-3(g) (1958).
The proposed legislation now before Congress would make the granting of a stay discretionary with the
Commission. See note 13 supra.
"'Securities Exchange Act H9 15A(g)-(h), 52 Stat. xo73 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 78o-3(g)-(h) (1958).
"
TSecurities Exchange Act § x5A(j), 52 Stat. 1074 (1938), 15 U.S.C. S 78o-3 (j) (x958).
7' Securities Exchange Act § 15A(k)(1), 52 Stat. 1074 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78o3(k)(x) (1958).
"' Securities Exchange Act § 15(c), 52 Stat. 1075 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 780(c) (r958).
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volving fictitious quotations. It may also erect safeguards relating to the financial
responsibility of brokers and dealers.
This diversity of treatment of the exchanges, on the one hand, and the NASD,
on the other, arises in part from historical reasons and in part from the fact that
the later Maloney Act represents a substantial advance over the pattern of self-
regulation applicable to the stock exchanges. Two new developments, the Silver case
and the current proposal that all brokers and dealers using the mails for securities
transactions belong to a section i5A registered association, heighten the need to
re-evaluate the various supervisory powers which the SEC should exercise over these
agencies of self-government. Proposals will now be advanced for improvement of




The self-regulatory philosophy is deeply imbedded in our system of securities
regulation. It has the overwhelming support of the industry; and the Special Study
recommends its continuance as a part of the total regulatory process s ° Nevertheless,
some of the supposed advantages of self-regulation are by no means clear. It has
generally been assumed that direct regulation would result in a pronounced
expansion of the Commission's staff; the multiplication of branch offices; a large
increase in the expenditure of public funds; and the substitution of the evils of
bureaucracy for the efficiency of private groups."' Experience has shown, however,
that self-regulation itself requires the expenditure of very substantial funds which
must be borne by the industry and ultimately by investors. A professional
bureaucracy must be built up to discharge effectively these responsibilities! 2 Because
of the higher pay scales in private industry, self-regulation is probably more costly
than the increased staff necessary to carry on direct governmental regulation. More-
over, the cost of regulation, whether of a direct or self-regulatory character, need
not be placed upon the public generally; an excise tax on the aggregate dollar amount
of securities transactions sufficient to cover the cost of this phase of regulation would
take care of this problem. Indeed, it seems unfortunate to this writer that a larger
percentage of the cost of federal securities regulation is not obtained by increasing
the various SEC filing fees and the existing securities transaction tax rather than
oSpecial Study, Pt. 4, at 722-28.
85 See the legislative committee reports recommending adoption of the Maloney Act. S. REP. No.
1455, at 3-4, and H.R. REP. No. 2307, at 4-5, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (z938). And see Report of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency Accompanying S. 1642, S. Ra. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 42 (x963).
"In x961, the NYSE had total revenues of $23,930,639 and total expenses of $20,430,551. Special
Study, pt. 4, at 516. It is impossible to determine the extent to which expenses represent the increment
of cost arising from increased self-regulatory duties. It is apparent, however, that the Exchange's
obligations entail very substantial expenditures. At the same time, the Special Study recommended
that the NASD rely far less on "volunteers" and that there be a substantial increase in the professional
staff so as to discharge adequately its regulatory responsibilities. Id., pt. 4, at 68o.
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by tapping the general revenues. This would place the burden of policing the
securities industry where it belongs--on issuers, brokers and dealers initially and
ultimately on investors. In any event, it is at least doubtful that the existing two-tier
structure costs less than direct regulation.
Cost, however, is not the only factor to be taken into account. Self-regulation
may be less cumbersome. The securities industry is in a position to carry on many
of the regulatory activities perhaps more effectively than would be possible through
the more remote means of direct regulation. Furthermore, industry self-government
surely is psychologically more acceptable to the industry regardless of cost. Self-
regulation has -the further advantage of directly involving the industry in the
regulatory process. No one likes external controls, least of all businessmen. Op-
portunity to participate in the regulatory process makes it much more palatable.
As Mr. Justice Douglas, then Chairman of the Commission, put it: "Self-discipline
is always more welcome than discipline imposed from above.""4  And he cm-
phasized perhaps the most important advantage:
From the broad public viewpoint, such regulation can be far more effective [than direct
regulation] .... Self-regulation ... can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning in-
fluence over business practices and business morality. By and large, government can
operate satisfactorily only by proscription. That leaves untouched large areas of conduct
and activity; some of it susceptible of government regulation but in fact too minute for
satisfactory control; some of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the realm of
ethics and morality. Into these large areas self-government, and self-government alone,
can effectively reach. For these reasons such self-regulation is by far the preferable course
from all viewpoints.8 5
For these and other reasons the Commission, the Congress, and the industry seem
justified in supporting the extension and refinement of the self-regulatory philosophy.
At the same time, however, the long history of stock exchange control by means
of a large degree of self-government and recent disclosures with respect to policing
of the over-the-counter markets suggest at least to this writer that there should be
further extensions and improvements in governmental oversight. These reforms
are long overdue. It is indeed a source of amazement that the stock exchanges
. The fees collected by the Commission for the fiscal year 1962 constituted only 30% of the total
appropriation for Commission operations. These fees go into the general fund and arc not available
for expenditure by the Commission. Fees are collected for registration of securities, qualification of
trust indentures, registration of exchanges and sale of copies of documents filed with the Commission.
The rates are exceedingly low: x/ioo of i per cent of the maximum aggregate price of securities
proposed to be offered but not less than $25; and 5/5oo of x per cent of the aggregate dollar amount
of stock transactions. Fees for other services arc nominal. 28 SEC ANN. REP. s66 (1962). For
example, the filing fees for registration of a five million dollar issue under the Securities Act of 1933 is
$500, whereas the filing fee for qualification of the same issue under California Corporate Securities Law
is $1298. CAL. CoRps. CoDE § 26003. The California fee schedule is undoubtedly too high in that the
receipts from fees exceed the cost of regulation. At the same time, however, the federal fees seem
entirely too low.
8 Address before the Bond Club of Hartford, Connecticut, supra note 3. And see Westwood &
Howard, Sell-Government in the Securities Industry, 17 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoD. 518 (1952); Cherrington,
National Association of Securities Dealers, 27 HAv. Bus. REV. 741 (1949).
"' Address Before the Bond Club of Hartford, Connecticut, supra note 3.
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have been able to preserve their autonomy and fend off reasonable governmental
oversight in view of the important and strategic position which they occupy in the
nation's economy.
Congress on numerous occasions has declared that the exchanges are "affected
with a national public interest.""6 The House Report on the Exchange Act put it
this way:
The bill proceeds on the theory that the exchanges are public institutions which the public
is invited to use for the purchase and sale of securities listed thereon, and are not private
clubs to be conducted only in accordance with the interests of their members. The great
exchanges of this country upon which millions of dollars of securities are sold are affected
with a public interest in the same degree as any other great utility. The Commission
is empowered, if the rules of the exchange in any important matter are not appropriate
for the protection of investors or appropriate to insure fair dealing, to order such changes
in the rules after due notice and hearings as it may deem necessary. The exchanges may
alter their rules if more effective means are discovered to meet the same or new problems.
Although a wide measure of initiative and responsibility is left with the exchanges, re-
served control is in the Commission if the exchanges do not meet their responsibility.
It is hoped that the effect of the bill will be to give to the well-managed exchanges that
power necessary to enable them to effect themselves needed reforms and that the occasion
for direct action by the Commission will not arise.87
It is believed that any such public institution to which has been "delegated
governmental power" should be subject to greater governmental oversight in several
respects s Such supervision should continue to be vested in the Securities and
Exchange Commission, "the official, expert guardian of the public interest in the field
of securities. ."8,
A. Admission and Discipline of Members
Memberships on the New York Stock Exchange are held by individuals rather
than broker-dealer firms. "Member firms" (partnerships) and "member corpora-
tions" must have at least one general partner or director-shareholder who is a
member of the Exchange. The general partners and voting shareholders of member
firms who are not themselves members of the Exchange are known as "allied
members." Under the Exchange constitution the Board of Governors must approve
allied members and the formation of member firms and member corporations. 90
Membership is attained by acquisition of a "seat" by gift or purchase. Any such
acquisition is subject to approval by the Exchange. The Exchange screens the
prospective member's qualifications with respect to integrity and competence when
88 See § 2 of the Exchange Act, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1958).
'T H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934).
s In Silver v. New York Stock Exch., supra note 29, at 371. Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, said:
"The purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act was to delegate govern-
mental power to working institutions which would undertake, at their own initiative, to enforce corn-
pliance with ethical as well as legal standards in a complex and changing industry."
"
9 Special Study, Pt. 4, at 724.
81*d., pt. i, at 75.
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he commences negotiations for the acquisition of a seat."' The Special Study concluded
that the Exchange's "screening, investigating, and testing program appears ... to
have operated effectively for the protection of the public." 2 The Special Study adds
that the program "appears to operate with considerable fairness from the point of
view of the candidates too .... "3 It should not be overlooked, however, that the
exchanges are semi-monopolies of immense economic power and that they exercise
delegated governmental powers 4 For these reasons the conclusion reached by
the Supreme Court in the Silver case seems inescapable: "Some form of review of
exchange self-policing, whether by administrative agency or by the courts, is there-
fore not at all incompatible with the fulfillment of the aims of the Securities
Exchange Act."95 Indeed, such review seems essential to avoid serious constitutional
problems arising from the delegation of unfettered governmental powers to the
exchange0 6
Analogies may be found for the type of governmental oversight by the SEC
which is needed. For example, the pattern set in section i5A of the Exchange Act
with respect to SEC review of the self-policing functions of the NASD would fill
the gap in existing governmental oversight of similar exchange activities. Accord-
ingly, Congress should give the Commission statutory authority, on the Commission's
own motion, or upon the application of any aggrieved person, to review denials of
admission to membership on any of the registered exchanges. There should be a
similar power with respect to admission to allied membership by virtue of an indi-
vidual becoming a partner or shareholder in a member firm. Similar review
powers should be given with respect to disciplinary actions taken against members,
allied members, member organizations and registered representatives. As in the
case of the NASD, the Commission should have the power to sustain the action
of the exchange or to reduce or eliminate the penalty if it is found to be excessive
or oppressive, but not to increase the penalty.
A somewhat different treatment of the review powers of a self-governing agency
is to be found in legislation providing for self-regulation of the legal profession by
"I d., pt. 1, at 75-79.
2 id. at 79. For a description of NYSE disciplinary procedures, see id., pt. 4, at 536-44.
" Id., pt. i, at 79.
04A Milwaukee broker has filed a multimillion-dollar class action in the federal district court for
the eastern district of Wisconsin against the NYSE charging that the Exchange rule that prevents non.
members for sharing in commissions on business they place through members violates the antitrust laws.
The suit was brought on behalf of 4,000 nonmember brokers and dealers who are alleged to have been
denied access to the trading facilities of the Exchange because of limited Exchange membership. Wall
Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. Regardless of the merits of this suit, serious legal and policy
questions arise concerning restrictions on entry into the securities business and use of exchange facilities.
" Supra note 29, at 359. Mr. Justice Goldberg, speaking for the majority, quotes SEC Chairman
William L. Cary's observation that "some government oversight is warranted, indeed necessary, to insure
that action in the name of self-regulation is neither discriminatory nor capricious." Cary, Self-Regulation
in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244, 246 (1963).
goC. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); A. L. A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (935); Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (944); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 352 (1963).
S xF-REGuLATiON iN THE SEcuRITIs INDUSTRY 681
means of the integrated bar. In some twenty-six states all lawyers are required to
belong to an official organization, the state bar association 7 The objectives of the
integrated bars are somewhat analogous to those of the exchanges in policing their
members and affiliated persons; in each case a major purpose is to regulate with
respect to standards of admission and professional ethics and to establish efficient
and fair disciplinary procedures to handle cases of misconduct. In every state
where an integrated bar exists, the courts have formally retained their traditional
disciplinary power over lawyers; and the disciplinary authority possessed by the state
bar is by way of a recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Court has the power
to follow the recommendations of the board of governors of the state bar or to
increase or decrease the discipline imposed against a member.98 In California, which
has an integrated bar, even though the Supreme Court is possessed with these powers,
a study some years ago found no case where the Court imposed a greater degree
of punishment than that of the state bar committee 9
The purpose of vesting review of disciplinary proceedings in the Securities and
Exchange Commission would be primarily to protect the rights of the individuals
concerned against capricious and arbitrary action by the exchanges' 00 The very
existence of the power of review would tend to cause the exchanges to undertake
a continuous self-examination of their disciplinary procedures. The added burden
on the Commission should not be excessive, based on the number of formal pro-
ceedings coming before the exchanges each year.' If the institution of review pro-
ceedings operated as a stay of the action only when ordered by the Commission, after
notice and hearing on the question, the legitimate interests of the exchange would
seem to be adequately protected. The question remains whether it would be
advisable to give the Commission the power to increase the penalty meted out by
the exchange for violation of the rules of the exchange, within the limits imposed
by exchange regulations. Aside from the factor of political expediency, the judicial
reluctance to assert such admitted powers in disciplinary proceedings under the in-
tegrated bar acts indicates that it might be futile to give the Commission this addi-
tional power.
1°2
" Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 848 (596i) (Harlan, J., dissenting). On the integrated bar
movement, see ORIu L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK McCoy, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAwYERs (i952); Glaser,
Three Papers on the Integrated Bar (mimseo. Aug. i96o).
"
8 Glaser, supra note 97. The California "integrated bar" act may be found in CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE
§§ 6000-6i54.
" PHILLIPS & McCoy, supra note 97, at 103. Curiously enough, these writers conclude that the
Court and Bar have been too lenient in discipline cases. Id. at 100-04.
... Professor Walter Gellhorn has written forcefully and convincingly of the need for protection of
the individual in his right to make a living. Although his chief concern was the occupational license,
his observations are pertinent to the questions here considered. WALTER GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENTAL RESTRAINTS C. 3 (1956).
... From 1956-62 the number of formal disciplinary cases decided by the board of governors of the
NYSE has averaged approximately eleven a year. Special Study, pt. 4, at 539.
'" See text at note 99 supra.
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B. Enforcement of Rules of the Exchanges
We have dealt with the matters of admissions and discipline from the standpoint
of protection of the individual. On the other hand, when the enforcement of ex-
change rules are weighed in terms of the public interest and the protection of
investors, it has been seen that the Commission lacks practical means of compelling
an exchange and its members to adhere to exchange rules.'0 3 As previously noted,
section 6(b) of the Exchange Act requires that the rules of a registered exchange
include provisions for disciplining members for conduct "inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade." Section 6(d), in effect, commands that the rules
of a registered exchange shall be "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to
protect investors." In the leading case of Baird v. Franklin,'4 the court of appeals
for the second circuit took the view that sections 6(b) and 6(d) impose "a twofold
duty upon an exchange of enacting certain rules and regulations and of seeing that
they are enforced."' 05  Accordingly, the court was of the view that failure of the
officials of a registered exchange to take disciplinary action against a member after
they know or have reason to believe that the member has violated an exchange rule
(in this case a conversion of a customer's securities) may give rise to a private
remedy against the exchange and its officials if prompt enforcement of exchange
rules would have prevented loss to the customer. 6 It is to be noted that this private
remedy for willful or negligent failure to enforce exchange rules gives no protection
against a member of the exchange who successfully conceals his misconduct so that
the exchange has no reason to suspect any violation of its rules. Furthermore, not all
rule violations will result in specific injury to a particular individual, yet they may
be generally harmful to investors.
Aside from the possibility of a private remedy for negligent enforcement of
exchange rules, the question arises whether the Commission should have some more
direct way of obtaining compliance with the rules of the exchanges. This objective
can be accomplished to a very great extent if the Commission will exercise its own
rule-making powers under sections io and ii of the Exchange Act. Under section
ii the Commission, without employing the mechanism of self-regulation, may enact
its own rules directly affecting the exchanges and their members with respect to floor
trading, off-floor trading by members, and the activities of specialists and odd-lot
dealers. Under section io the Commission may regulate with respect to short sales,
stop-loss orders, and manipulative or deceptive devices and contrivances. We have
noted that since the inception of the Exchange Act the Commission has followed
the practice of "suggesting" that the exchanges adopt section ii rules as rules of the
' See note 54 supra.
104 45 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
105 Id. at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting).
10' judges Swan and Augustus N. Hand acceded to this view but affirmed a finding for the defendant
for failure to prove causation. The doctrine that such a private remedy exists was followed in Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. z963).
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exchange rather than for the Commission to take direct action and adopt such rules
either alone or in conjunction with exchange rules covering the same ground.
In proposing new rule xna-i restricting floor trading, the Commission, for the
first time, would undertake direct action under its section ix rule-making powers."' 7
If rule iia-i is issued by the Commission, a member of the Exchange who violates
the floor-trading rule of the Exchange would also violate rule ixa-i. The Commis-
sion has ample authority to issue its own rules not only on floor trading, but with
respect to transactions by specialists and odd-lot transactions.
As has been seen, this approach has already been used by the Commission in
regulating short selling.'0  Section io(a) of the Exchange Act empowers the Com-
mission to make rules in the public interest and for the protection of investors with
respect to short sales of securities registered on a national securities exchange; viola-
dons of such rules are declared to be unlawful. The Commission did not at first
promulgate a rule on short selling; instead, in 1935, it "suggested" that the exchanges
adopt the so-called Kennedy trading rules.' 9 One of these rules provided that a
member should not effect a short sale at a price below the last sale price of such
security on the exchange.-" This rule, designed to prevent short sales which had a
demoralizing effect on the market, merely codified the existing stock exchange re-
quirements which had been in effect since 193.111 After the market break of 1937,
the Commission re-examined the Exchange's short-selling rule, and as a result the
Commission, in February 1938, promulgated its own rules on short selling." 2 The
rule was relaxed somewhat in the following year as a result of extensive discussions
between the Commission and NYSE officials. On several occasions since that time,
""Proposed rule iia-I in part provides:
(a) No member of a National Securities Exchange, while on the floor of such exchange, shall initiate,
directly or indirectly, any transaction in any security admitted to trading on such exchange, for any
account in which such member has an interest, or for any account with respect to which such member
has discretion as to the time of execution, the choice of security to be bought or sold, the total amount
of any security to be bought or sold, or whether any such transaction shall be one of purchase or sale.
(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this rule shall not apply to:
(6) any transaction effected in conformity with a plan designed to eliminate floor trading activities
which are not beneficial to the market and which plan has been adopted by an exchange and declared
effective by the Commission. For the purpose of this rule, a plan filed with the Commission by a
National Securities Exchange shall not become effective unless the Commission, having due regard for the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, for the public interest, and for the protection of investors.
declares the plan to be effective.
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 729 o, April 9, 1964.
'
0
, See note 57 supra. On the SEC short-selling rules, see 2 Lotus Loss, SEcurTiEs REGuLATIoN
1229-35 (ad ed. ig6i).
09 See p. 672 supra.
1 1 SEC ANN. ReP. 44 (1935).
. See Special Study, pt. 2, at 251.
12 Ibid. Rule 3b-3, 17 C.F.R. § 24 0.3 b-3 (1949) defines a short sale; Rule soa-s (a), 57 C.F.R.
§ 240.soa-x(a) (1949), places restrictions on short sales. In general, short sales are prohibited unless
made above the last sale price, usually by % point or more, except that such sale may be made at the
last price if that price was itself higher than the last preceding different price at which a sale, "regular
way," was effected on the exchange.
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the NYSE has requested the Commission to make further modifications in the
short sale rules but the Commission has refused to do so.113 This kind of direct
action by the Commission seems to be precisely what the Congress envisaged under
the reserve power "if the exchanges do not meet their responsibility.""' 4 Such direct
regulation is in no sense "an attack on Wall Street."
C. Rule-Making by the Exchanges
We have already noted that the rules of the exchanges must be filed with the
Commission and that registration hinges upon a finding by the Commission that
such rules are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors...." 15
The Commission also may initiate specific changes in the rules and practices of a
registered exchange with respect to those matters enumerated in section xg(b) of
the Exchange Act." 6  Curiously enough, the Exchange Act does not expressly
require the exchanges to notify the Commission in advance of any rule change,
even if the rule change relates to the matters enumerated in section xg(b). Under
section 6(a)(4) a registered exchange is only required to furnish the Commission
copies of any amendments to its rules "forthwith upon their adoption." The Com-
mission has not been given the express power to abrogate even those rule changes
which would fail to meet the standards imposed upon original registration.
The failure of the Exchange Act to give the Commission explicit authority to
abrogate rule changes, even where the Commission can initiate changes, should
not be construed to permit a registered exchange to defeat the purposes of the
Exchange Act by first filing a constitution and set of rules that meet the standards
of fairness to investors followed by later amendments which conflict with the stand-
ard. Although the Commission claims the power to compel advance filing, the
NYSE denies any such authority. The NYSE, however, has agreed to give notice
of changes, but does not concede that the Commission has authority to pass upon
an amendment in advance of its adoption."7 Under these circumstances, the Ex-
change Act should be amended to eliminate this quibble by expressly giving the
Commission the same powers to overrule changes by the exchanges as has been
conferred with respect to the NASD and any other registered securities associations
organized under section i5A of the Exchange Act."8 There appears to be absolutely
no reason for this difference in treatment between the exchanges and the NASD.
D. Compulsory Membership in the NASD or Other Registered Associations
Under its current amendment program the Commission has proposed to remove
the intrastate exemption in the broker-dealer registration provisions of section 15 of
1 See Special Study, pt. 2, at 252.
114 See p. 679 supra.
1
'
5 Securities Exchange Act § 6(d), 48 Stat. 886 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 7 8f(d) (1958); see p. 670 supra.
"x See p. 671 and note 52 supra.
... See note 51 supra.
"I' For the Commission's authority to supervise NASD rule changes, see p. 676 supra.
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the Exchange Act.11. Thus, any broker or dealer who uses the mails to effect
transactions in any security (with some exceptions) otherwise than on a national
securities exchange would have to register with the Commission in accordance with
section I5 (b). The bill as passed by the Senate removes the intrastate exemption,'
20
but the House bill, as amended by the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance
of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, would continue to
exclude from registration any broker or dealer "whose business is exclusively intra-
state."'
121
At the same time, however, both the House and Senate bills require that all
brokers and dealers registered under section I5 (b) also be members of a securities
association registered under section 15 A of the Exchange Act.' 2 Section 15 A would
also be amended to provide that registered associations must adopt rules establishing
standards of training, experience, competence, and financial responsibility for mem-
bers and their employees. 2 3 Under sections 7(a)(2) and (4) of these bills, the
association would be authorized to expel a member. Thus, the NASD or any other
registered association would be allowed, indeed required, to establish professional
standards for persons engaged in the securities business as principals or as registered
representatives, and to police the industry by enforcing disciplinary rules subject,
of course, to Commission review. The Commission justifies these proposals on the
marked expansion taking place in the numbers of securities firms and registered
representatives since 1945 and the need for raising standards of fitness, competence
and financial responsibility of persons engaged in the securities business. Chairman
William L. Cary has put it this way:
The steady growth in the number of investors, the complex nature of the securities
markets, the reliance which the investing public necessarily places upon the competence
and character of professionals in those markets: all of these factors militate against con-
tinuation of the existing ease of entry and of the lack of qualification standards. These
conditions subject the public to undue hazards and unnecessarily complicate the task of
regulation.' 2 4
This proposal for compulsory membership in the NASD or similar organization
(with authority in the Commission to grant exemptions where necessary and appro-
priate) would force about 300 firms to join a registered securities association per-
forming self-regulatory functions in order to continue in the securities business.'
2 5
Among the firms affected would be some of the large mutual fund sales organiza-
... See statement of SEC Chairman William L. Cary, in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, on S. z642, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 6o (1963).
"0o S. 1642, § 6(a). S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Ses. 46 (1963).
...H.R. 6793, § 6(a), as approved by the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce for consideration by the full committee. The bill has
since been reported by the House Committee. See H.R. REs. No. 1418, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (i964).
12 S. 1642, H.R. 6793, § 6(a), 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1964).
15S. 1642, H.R. 6793, § 7(a), 88th Cong., ist Sess. (1964).
' Statement of Chairman Cary, in Hearings, supra note X19, at 45.
"
2 5 Id. at 43. S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., sst Sess. 43 (1963).
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dons with several thousand salesmen. Strong opposition has come from these
organizations; they object to the legislation on the basis of policy and supposed
unconstitutionality.
Although it is possible to make noises of unconstitutionality concerning
a guild system of securities control, it is believed that recent cases concerning com-
pulsory membership in professional associations and in labor unions foreclose consti-
tutional issues under the first and fifth amendments. Constitutional objections
to state-compelled membership in an integrated bar were rejected in Lathrop v.
Donohue126 because of the state's interest in fostering the public purposes served
by a bar association made up of all lawyers practicing within the state. Furthermore,
in Lathrop, the rule-making and disciplinary powers of the bar association were
subject to supervision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court upon the complaint of any
member' 27  In Railway Employees Dept v. Hanson,2 " a federal statute compelling
an employee to join a labor union and pay dues in order to continue employment
was sustained on the theory that one who receives the benefits of collective bargaining
should contribute to its support. In the Court's view, Congress' power to regulate
labor relations in interstate industries permitted a union shop to be fostered as a
stabilizing force in facilitating industrial peace. At the same time, however, certain
limits are imposed upon such associations with a captive membership. Thus, they
may be constitutionally prohibited from supporting issues not fairly related to the
association's objectives. 29 Aside from these limitations, section 15A as proposed
to be amended gives the SEC broad supervision over the operations of registered
associations sufficient to prevent a constitutional attack based upon a claim of im-
proper delegation of legislative powers' °
Some of the objections based on policy grounds are that: (x) the power to deter-
mine whether a person or firm could commence or remain in business would be
vested in an association made up of business competitors; (2) the persons exercising
these judicial functions might be engaged in a competing mutual fund business or
might be brokers or dealers in competition with the funds; (3) members of the
association might be compelled to divulge the details of their business operations
to the association, and thus, indirectly to competitors; (4) self-regulation is in-
compatible with compulsory membership in the self-regulatory body.13' The
opponents of compulsory membership in a self-regulatory body urge that they are
126 367 U.S. 82o (1g61).
.. Id. at 825. And see In re Integration of the Bar, 5 Wis. 2d 618, 93 N.W.2d 6ox (1958). For
a discussion of constitutional restrictions on private associations, see Developments in the La--udicial
Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAsV. L. Rav. 983, 1058-69 (z963).
228 351 U.S. 225 (z956).
" Lathrop v. Donohue, supra note 126; International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961); Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). See Developments in the Law,
rupra note 127, 1o64-67.
180 See note 96 supra.
"I See testimony of Mr. Arthur V. Toupin, general counsel of Insurance Securities, Inc., in Hearings on
H.R. 6789, H.R. 6793, S. 1642, supra note 9, pt. 2, at 836-45.
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already subject to ample direct regulation, but that if additional regulation is
necessary, it should be given to the Commission directly rather than to an association
of competitors. 3 2
This line of argument has frequently been advanced by opponents of the idea of
an integrated state bar. 3 Yet in a number of states these compulsory associations
have marked up a notable record of achievement in raising standards of the pro-
fession and in carrying on important public service activities. Although there have
been complaints that the NASD is dominated and controlled by New York Stock
Exchange members to the prejudice of those firms engaged exclusively in an over-the-
counter business,'3 4 the NASD seems generally to have merited the support and
confidence of the overwhelming majority of securities brokers and dealers. Never-
theless, there is a conflict of interest between NYSE member firms and the small
nonmember over-the-counter firms. The heart of the stock exchange system is based
upon a restricted membership; a preferential commission rate schedule on dealings
between members; the setting of minimum commission rates charged to all out-
siders, including nonmember professionals and institutional investors; and the ban
on sharing commissions with nonmember firms who perforce must place orders on
stock exchange transactions on the Big Board through a member firm.3 5 Thus, the
small over-the-counter firm is placed in the position where it must accept such NYSE
business as is placed with it for fear of losing its customer; and even though it has
certain fixed overhead costs, competition with NYSE member firms precludes it
from charging an additional commission to that charged by the member firm for
executing the order. The monopoly power of the stock exchanges, and particularly
of the Big Board, as well as the present autonomous position of the registered
exchanges under the Exchange Act, raise the question of the extent to which the
courts may use the antitrust laws to intervene in stock exchange affairs to protect
nonmembers (and even members) from anti-competitive practices which thwart the
grand design of the Exchange Act or to prevent arbitrary or capricious actions
against such persons.
In the Silver case a nonmember broker-dealer applied to the NYSE for direct-
wire telephone connections with a member firm. Temporary approval was granted
and the connections established. Later, the Exchange ordered the member firm to
terminate such connections which it was compelled to do under an Exchange rule on
file with the Commission.' The Court held that the self-regulatory duties imposed
on the NYSE by the Exchange Act did not exempt it from the antitrust laws nor
"id. at 840.
"'The arguments for arid against bar integration, as they appear in the professional literature, are
summarized in Glaser, supra note 97, pt. 2, at 20-3o; Gilb, The State Bar Idea, 34 CAL. ST. B.J. 866,
870-82 (x959).
214 N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1964, p. 2, col. 3.
... For a discussion of the structural aspects of stock exchange commission rates, see Special Study,
pt. 2, at 294-351.
211 See p. 668 supra.
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justify it in enforcing the rule without according Silver the notice and hearing
which he had requested. The Court noted that had the concerted action of the
Exchange and its members occurred in a context free of federal regulation under
the Exchange Act it would have been a per se violation of section i of the Sherman
Act. A majority concluded that since the Exchange Act contains no express
exemption from the antitrust laws, repeal would be implied only if necessary to
effectuate the broad objectives of the Exchange Act. The Court emphasized that the
act failed to give the Commission the jurisdiction to review particular instances
of enforcement of exchange rules, as had been done with the NASD. Therefore,
there was "nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the anti-
trust function of insuring that an exchange will not in some cases apply its rules
so as to do injury to competition which cannot be justified as furthering legitimate
self-regulative ends."137  Government oversight was necessary to make sure that
Exchange action taken in the name of self-regulation was not discriminatory, arbi-
trary, or capricious. In the absence of SEC supervision, the vacuum was to be filled
by judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws. And Justice Goldberg concluded:
What is basically at issue here is whether the type of partnership between government and
private enterprise that marks the design of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 can
operate effectively to insure the maintenance of such standards in the long run. We have
today provided not a brake upon the private partner executing the public policy of self-
regulation but a balance wheel to insure that it can perform this necessary activity in a
setting compatible with the objectives of both the antitrust laws and the Securities Ex-
change Act.' 38
Although the precise limits of the doctrine announced in the Silver case are yet
to be determined, perhaps other anticompetitive conduct of the Exchange such as
that built into the commission rate structure (which is highly discriminatory to
nonmembers) may give rise to injunction and treble damage actions under the
Sherman Act.
The Thill Sectrities Corp. suit against the New York Stock Exchange, previously
referred to,'39 is framed on the theory that the NYSE rules preventing member
firms from splitting commissions with nonmember firms on business the latter
brings to the Exchange violate the antitrust laws. Although the Commission has
broad powers under section i1(b) to alter the commission rate structure, so far
it has not tackled the discrimination between member and nonmember firms entailed
therein. However, the NYSE rules against rebates are riddled with exceptions based
upon "reciprocal business arrangements," 140 "special services"' 41 to nonmember firms,
x Silver v. New York Stock Exch., supra note 29, at 358.
1 8 Id. at 366-67. Following remand of the Silver case, the NYSE settled the Si million suit for
$375,000. Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1964, p. 3, cOl. 4.
"" See note 94 supra.
140 Special Study, pt. 2, at 302-07.
... Id., pt. 2, at 307-10.
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and other subtle arrangements to circumvent the rigid rules against rebates.'
On the other hand, the Exchange has refused to modify its rules so as to provide for
quantity discounts to large-volume purchasers, either professional or institutional. 43
Unfortunately, this inflexible policy against quantity discounts has in turn given rise
to the "give-up or directed split' '144 as well as to various reciprocal arrangements.
Until the Exchange and the Commission come to grips with the problems generated
by the current rate structure, the Exchange may well be vulnerable to suits under
the antitrust laws.
It is doubtful that the exchanges can continue to operate while sitting underneath
the sword of Damocles represented by the antitrust laws. A practical solution
would be for the exchanges and the SEC to join in a proposal to Congress that
registered exchanges be granted statutory immunity from the antitrust laws in
return for an expansion of SEC supervisory powers along the lines here suggested.
In order to protect individual brokers and dealers from arbitrary or oppressive group
action, the statute should accord a member or nonmember of an exchange the right
to a hearing before the exchange's governing body before policies or practices
affecting him are finally determined. Furthermore, those persons should have the
right of appeal to the Securities and Exchange Commission after the exhaustion of
remedies at the level of the exchange. The Reed-Bulwinkle Act granting antitrust
immunity with respect to certain rate agreements among carriers subject to the
jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) provides an analogy and
precedent for this type of procedure .1' That act, passed in 1948, authorizes common
carriers to apply to -the ICC for approval of agreements ". .. relating to rates, fares,
classifications, divisions, allowances or charges... or rules and regulations pertaining
thereto, or procedures for the joint consideration, initiation or establishment there-
of....4"' Approval by the ICC will relieve the parties from the operation of the
antitrust laws in making and effectuating any such agreement, if carried out in
conformity with the terms and conditions prescribed by the ICC. The Commission
is to grant approval of an agreement only if it finds that relief from the operation
of the antitrust laws would further the national transportation policy established by
the Interstate Commerce Act. Moreover, the act specifically provides that approval
shall be denied to any agreement which establishes procedures for the joint deter-
mination of any matter by a group of carriers unless the Commission finds that
"under the agreement there is accorded to each party the free and unrestrained right
to take independent action either before or after any determination arrived at through
such procedure."'147 The latter provision is designed to protect particular carriers
... For a description of the variety of "special services" currently being furnished by member firms
without payment other than the receipt of commission business, see id., pt. 2, at 312-13.
1
"Id., pt. 2, at 311-X2.
1
"Id., pt. 2, at 316-18.
t 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. S 5b (I958).
1
"Reed-Bulwinkle Act § 5a(2), 62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5b(2) (1958).
t T Reed-Bulwinklc Act § 5a(6), 62 Stat. 473 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b)(6) (1958). See CAmu H.
FJLDA, CoMPETrriou iN TH REGULATED INDusyriE-TRNSPORTATION 283-309 (596i).
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from arbitrary or oppressive group action. It thus provides an excellent model for
similar legislation applicable to registered exchanges.
CONCLUSION
As this paper goes to press, the fate of the proposal calling for mandatory mem-
bership of brokers and dealers in a registered securities association is in doubt.
The House Committee on Interstate Commerce has approved the House bill, after
eliminating the provisions which would require brokers and dealers using the
mails or interstate facilities for securities transactions to belong either to the NASD
or a similar association registered under section 15A of the Exchange Act. 4 '
Instead, the new version would allow a choice between membership in such a self-
regulatory agency or similar direct regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. A number of the large mutual fund sales organizations have indi-
cated a preference for the latter form of regulation. In such event, they should
be required to bear the cost of this additional form of regulation. 40 If the Securities
Act amendments of 1964 are adopted, they will go a long way towards improving
standards of investor protection for securities traded in the over-the-counter markets.
This leaves the supervisory role of the Commission vis vis the exchanges for
future solution. The suggestions here made are in my opinion reasonable and, in
the long run, they are conservative. It may well. be that the historical conception
that the Exchange is a private club is the principal stumbling block to the moderate
reforms of the sort here suggested. The Supreme Court has now confirmed the
general community feeling that this "private club" concept belongs to a simpler age
and is no longer valid. Once this dogma is dispelled, as it must be, we may be
able to engage in a rational debate on the improvements needed to allow the Exchange
to play its proper role in our modern economy.
..
8 N.Y. Times, May 8, 1964, P. 43, col. I
...A House Appropriations subcommittee which is currently considering the SEC $15,225,0oo budget
request for the fiscal year ending June 3o, r965 is reported to be prodding the Commission to raise its fee
schedule in order to shift to the securities industry more of the cost of regulation. Fees currently col-
lected bring in only $3,ooo,ooo a year. Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1964, p. 4, col. 2. And see note
83 supra.
